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philosophy of mind – on the heels of the 
mainstream tendency in epistemology of 
regarding the subject as a perfect knower – is still 
that of investigating intentionality irrespective of 
the context in which an intentional state occurs, 
Ratcliffe puts the subject, its current and past 
experiences, and its interpersonal relations back 
at the center of the investigation. 
In so doing, however, Ratcliffe may run the 
risk of overlooking the methodological intricacy 
of such an undertaking. In the first place, a 
phenomenological investigation of real 
hallucinations necessarily relies on verbal reports, 
which can be more or less reliable depending on 
different factors such as, for instance, the 
introspective - and linguistic - skills of a subject. 
Moreover, a purely phenomenological approach 
to intentionality is based on the disputable 
assumption that every aspect of a given 
experience is phenomenally accessible to the 
subject. In the introduction, Ratcliffe recognizes 
that «phenomenology alone does not always 
suffice to determine one’s actual intentional 
state» (p. 2) and anticipates this line of criticism 
stressing that Real Hallucinations is «phenome-
nological in emphasis» (p. 2), and therefore non-
phenomenal aspects are irrelevant to his 
argument. However, it cannot be simply ruled out 
that non-phenomenal aspects might influence the 
overall phenomenology of the experience in ways 
that are not accessible to the subject. For instance, 
if the goal is to understand what the sense of 
being in a given intentional state is and how it 
arises, and if it is admitted that it depends 
importantly on other mental states, phenomenally 
inaccessible aspects of past (or co-occurrent) 
experiences might significantly influence the 
phenomenology itself of the state under 
consideration. Furthermore, even granting that 
non-phenomenal aspects are irrelevant to the 
investigation of experience, a certain level of 
abstraction seems to be hardly avoidable. For 
instance, the description of conflicted states 
would require a clear-cut and therefore idealized 
definition of typical cases of standard intentional 
states (e.g., perception, memory, imagination) 
and of their features. In order to tell what aspects 
of what kinds of intentional state come together 
in conflicted and ambiguous experiences, we need 
to make categorical and somehow artificial 
distinctions not only among different kinds of 
intentional states, but also among the different 
aspects of a given experience and their unique 
contribution to the overall phenomenology. 
Similarly, it is unclear in what way we could 
investigate how and to what extent an experience is 
affected by other intentional states without 
artificially isolating it from past and future 
experiences, and from co-occurring intentional 
states. 
Certainly, however, a complete and satisfying 
taxonomy of experience goes way beyond the 
scope of Real Hallucinations, which has the 
undeniable merit of highlighting the complexity 
of human experience, and of demanding to 
anyone genuinely interested in bridging the gap 
between phenomenological accounts and other 
more objective ways of describing intentionality, 
to be aware of such complexity. 
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The current state of personality assessment for 
clinical purposes is largely dominated by the ever-
present Big Five model, a taxonomy for personality 
traits based on language descriptors. This model is 
consistent with the Lexical hypothesis, which 
claims that the personality characteristics most 
important to people become, sooner or later, part 
of their language; furthermore, these traits are 
likely to be represented in language by a single 
word, as individuated in the five factors of this 
model: openness to experience, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism. These 
were established using factor analysis in the 90s, 
making this model intrinsically theory-free. This 
top-down approach to the daunting task of 
classifying human personality traits, however all-
encompassing and noteworthy from certain 
perspectives, is flawed in the sense that it does not 
account for what biologically causes our 
personality. 
There is much that is still unknown about the 
complex workings of the brain, however, it is 
possible to ascertain that personality is largely 
determined by the fine tuning of certain systems 
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(or circuits), mostly involving anatomically 
ancient structures. To find these underlying 
mechanisms, classify and methodically investigate 
the influence they have on the behaviour of 
animals, has been one of Jaak Panksepp’s most 
important contributions to the fields of 
neuroscience and psychology. In essence, he gave 
birth to the field of Affective Neuroscience. 
Affective Neuroscience is the study of the 
subcortical affective BrainMind (the term Panksepp 
used to underline the assumption of monism). One 
of Panksepp’s main works, The Archaeology of Mind: 
Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions, 
offers an evidence-based taxonomy of the seven 
primary emotional systems that explain why and 
how we behave the way we do. These systems have 
been found to be common across all mammalian 
species and constitute effective evolutionary 
solutions for successful animal life on earth. The 
seven circuits (and corresponding behaviours) 
Panksepp identified in his research are: SEEKING 
(exploration, motivation), RAGE (anger), FEAR 
(anxiety), PANIC (sadness), PLAY (joy), CARE 
(nurturance), LUST (sexual arousal). 
In fact, since the primary emotions that are 
generated in those systems have intrinsically 
pleasant or unpleasant affects, they have a 
learning-facilitating function that is basically a 
“birthright survival system” for all mammals. This 
has already been thoroughly demonstrated by 
Panksepp (see J. PANKSEPP, L. BIVEN, The 
Archaeology of Mind, W.W. Norton Company, 
2012) using a variety of methods. For example, he 
showed that the artificial stimulation of some of 
those systems can be used as reward/punishment 
in a behavioural task with high effectiveness. The 
system of PLAY for instance, when activated, 
produces an internal state so pleasing that the 
animal actively seeks it; connecting the pressing 
of a lever (or whatever action needs to be trained) 
with the stimulation of this system leads to the 
reinforcement of that behaviour. Since the way 
we react to external stimuli, both in terms of our 
explicit behaviours and our internal states, can be 
considered to constitute our personality, these 
subcortical systems are the causal mechanisms 
that give rise to personality. Hence their 
importance in Panksepp’s work. 
The theory of personality built on the principles 
of affective neuroscience proposes the existence of 
endophenotypes, which are primary emotional-
affective personality profiles generated initially from 
our individual genomes; LUST has been inexplicably 
excluded from the systems that define our 
personality. Items in questionnaires such as the Big 
Five Questionnaire (BFQ) do not tap directly into 
the primary emotions that define endophenotypes, 
hence cannot be used to measure them. However, 
the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scale (ANPS) 
was specifically built to test Panksepp’s hypothesis 
that such endophenotypes exist. Its items are very 
explicit in asking about primary emotions so that 
only a minimum degree of cognitive processing is 
required to answer. Of course, ANPS is only a 
language-based report. More direct data will be 
needed to support Panksepp’s view, which, given the 
present level of technology, is still difficult to obtain. 
The ANPS is composed of 112 items arranged in 
fourteen blocks that include one question for each 
system plus one related to Spirituality and a filler 
research question; the complete version can be 
found in the appendix of the book. 
One of the main problems identified in 
clinical applications of the BFQ is the genericity 
of the factor Emotional Stability, which lumps 
together an array of negative affects, that 
correspond to activity in the FEAR, RAGE and 
PANIC emotional systems. Considering that the 
extremes of each of these emotions lead to 
different psychopathologies, it is important that 
the tests we use can distinguish between them. A 
person might have considerable issues in 
controlling anger but not suffer from depressive 
feelings and/or anxiety. Yet, this simple example 
would result in a medium to high score in the 
Emotional Stability factor, which does not give 
the clinician any insight whatsoever into the 
specificity of the patient’s sufferings. The 
Affective Neuroscience Personality Scale, instead, 
classifies symptoms on the basis of the 
dysregulated emotional system that brought them 
about. For this reason, the resulting scales are 
more useful for diagnostic purposes than the 
Emotional Stability factor in the BFQ. 
Considering the shortcomings of the Big Five 
model and the fact that Panksepp does not rely on 
it but developed the ANPS as an alternative scale 
to measure personality, it is perhaps strange that 
such a large portion of the book is dedicated to it. 
However, the attention he devotes to the Big Five 
is justified by the deeply-rooted position this 
model holds in the field of personality psychology 
worldwide; to challenge such a pillar of the field 
requires extensive discussion of its merits and 
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flaws, otherwise the author’s proposal for a new 
system would lack legitimacy. 
As Panksepp underlines in the chapter on 
Epigenetics and Psychopharmacology, the new 
model for personality has had an enthusiastic 
reception as well as many successful applications. 
Biotechnological studies have shown that 
personality traits acquired through epigenetic 
mechanisms are among the characteristics which 
can be inherited. Spending quality emotional time 
with parents can, thanks to epigenetics, promote 
the development of these emotional systems in 
such a way that reduces the incidence of problems 
like Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) and the necessity for pharmaceutical 
treatment later on. The same principle applies at 
a cultural level: in play-promoting environments, 
the PLAY system is more stimulated and becomes 
stronger, providing a protective factor against the 
development of personality related disorders. 
This feature is also inheritable due to epigenetic 
mechanisms. 
In the field of neuropsychopharmacology, the 
research conducted on the mammalian BrainMind 
on the basis of Panksepp’s model has led to the 
development of three new antide-pressant treat-
ments: the molecule GLYX-13 for the treatment of 
depressive symptoms has already passed toxicology 
tests and is having significant effects; deep-brain 
stimulation (DBS) of the SEEKING system is 
effective in counteracting major depression 
symptomatology, up to the point of eventually 
reversing it; and the opioid buprenorphine has 
been shown to be highly effective for the treatment 
of suicidal thoughts deriving from hyperactivity of 
the PAIN/Sadness system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Emotional Foundations of Personality can be 
considered a textbook, both in terms of its content 
and structure. The background topics, especially 
Affective Neuroscience and the history of 
personality studies, are discussed in the beginning of 
the book, providing the necessary foundation for the 
more technical chapters at the end, which present 
neuroimaging studies and evidence from the field of 
neuropsychopharmacology. The book is structured 
in a way that allows the reader to peruse any chapter 
independently of the others. On the one hand, this is 
positive as the reader can focus only on the sections 
they are particularly interested in; on the other hand, 
the price paid for the independence of the chapters 
is a certain repetitiveness: the most crucial 
information is examined time and again throughout 
the book, excessively prolonging the reading 
experience, which, at times, can also feel a little 
fragmented. 
In spite of this, Panksepp’s work is certainly 
worth reading. This insightful book not only puts 
forward a fascinating new approach to personality 
theory but also provides a thorough account of all 
the steps taken to make it useful also for clinical 
purposes. At various points throughout the 
discussion, the author states that further research is 
needed to develop the field of Affective Neurosciences 
and to improve its clinical applications; still, plenty 
has already been done. To all interested in knowing 
more about the subject, Panksepp’s book and the 
twenty-eight pages of references included in it are 
undoubtedly a very good starting point. 
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